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Abstract
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected
graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the
graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of
games. Given the graph structure we define a collection of spanning trees, where each
spanning tree specifies a particular way by which players communicate and determines
a payoff vector of marginal contributions of all the players. The average tree solution is
defined to be the average of all these payoff vectors. It is shown that if a game has a
complete communication structure, then the proposed solution coincides with the Shapley
value, and that if the game has a cycle-free communication structure, it is the solution
proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). We introduce the notion of link-
convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree
solution lies in the core. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with
a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity.
Keywords: Cooperative game, graph structure, single-valued solution, core, convexity,
spanning tree.
AMS subject classification: 90B18, 91A12, 91A43.
JEL code: C71.
1 Introduction
A situation in which sets of players can realize joint payoffs by cooperating can be for-
mulated as a cooperative game (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and
v : 2N → R a characteristic function with v(S) the joint payoff that the players in S ⊂ N
can obtain by cooperation. In the standard approach it is assumed that any coalition S
can form and achieve worth v(S). However, there are many situations of interest where
cooperation among people depends on how they can communicate and coordinate.
In a seminal paper, Myerson [13] formulates such games with communication struc-
ture by a triple (N, v, L), where N is a set of players, v : 2N → R a characteristic function,
and L ⊂ {{i, j}| i, j ∈ N, i = j} a set of edges on N representing communication links
between players. A coalition S can only cooperate if the set of nodes S is connected in
the graph (N,L) and thus any two players in S can communicate with each other, either
directly or indirectly through other players in S. Myerson also proposes a single-valued
solution for games with communication structure. Nowadays this solution is known as the
Myerson value. The Myerson value of a game with communication structure equals the
Shapley value of the so-called Myerson restricted game, induced by the communication
structure, and is characterized by component efficiency and fairness.
Alternative characterizations of the Myerson value are given in Myerson [14] and
Borm, Owen, and Tijs [2]. In the latter paper also another solution for games with com-
munication structure has been proposed, the so-called positional value, see also Meessen
[12]. This value is characterized by component efficiency and balanced total threats, see
Slikker [17]. Recently, Herings, van der Laan, and Talman [9] introduced a new solution
for the class of games with cycle-free communication structure, the so-called average tree
solution. This solution is characterized by component efficiency and component fairness.
The average tree solution lies in the core if the characteristic function v is superadditive.
This property does not hold for the Myerson value and the positional value.
In this paper we aim to generalize the average tree solution to the class of all games
with communication structure. A tree (N, T ) is a cycle-free directed graph, with T a
collection of n − 1 directed edges, such that for exactly one node, the root, there exists a
unique directed path in (N,T ) to every other node. To generalize the average tree solution
to the class of all games with communication structure, we define for every graph (N,L) a
collection of admissible spanning trees on the graph. A spanning tree is admissible if each
player has exactly one successor in each component of his subordinates. Such a spanning
tree describes how in the graph a player can communicate with other players in such a
way that two players cannot communicate with each other if one is not a subordinate of
the other. The payoff of a player in a given admissible spanning tree is then the marginal
contribution of that player when he joins his subordinates, and the proposed average tree
1
solution is the average of the payoff vectors for all admissible spanning trees.
We show that for games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree
solution coincides with the average tree solution in Herings et al. [9] and that for games with
complete communication structure the average tree solution coincides with the Shapley
value. In this way the average tree solution is a proper generalization of both the Shapley
value for games with full communication and the average tree solution for games with
cycle-free communication structure. The number of admissible spanning trees depends on
the structure of the graph. Typically, when there are more cycles, there are more ways
for players to communicate and the number of admissible spanning trees becomes larger.
In a cycle-free graph (N,L) with n players there are exactly n admissible spanning trees,
while if the graph is complete there are n! admissible spanning trees. So, the average tree
solution is the average of a certain number of marginal vectors of the induced restricted
game, where the number depends on the communication structure. It therefore differs from
the Myerson value, which for every game with communication structure is given by the
average of all n! marginal vectors of the restricted game.
In this paper we also introduce the notion of link-convexity for games with com-
munication structure. For games with complete communication structure, the notion of
link-convexity coincides with convexity, but in general the notion of link-convexity is weaker
than convexity. For games with cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even
weaker than superadditivity. It is well known that for convex games the Shapley value lies
in the core and so the Myerson value lies in the core of the game when the (restricted) game
is convex. We show that for arbitrary games with communication structure, the average
tree solution is in the core if the game is link-convex. This confirms the result of Herings et
al. [9] for a game with cycle-free communication structure that the average tree solution is
in the core if the game is superadditive. Talman and Yamamoto [18] give for games with
cycle-free communication structure a condition that is even weaker than link-convexity to
guarantee that the average tree solution is in the core. We also illustrate that the Myerson
value may not be in the core if the game is link-convex but not convex.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section on games
with communication structure. In Section 3 the average tree solution for all games with
communication structure is introduced. In Section 4 the classes of cycle-free and com-
plete communication structures are discussed. In Section 5 the notion of link-convexity is
introduced and it is shown that the average tree solution lies in the core if the game is
link-convex. Section 6 concludes.
2
2 TU-games with communication structure
A transferable utility cooperative game with communication structure is represented by
(N, v, L) with N = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of players, v : 2N → R a characteristic function,
and (N,L) an undirected graph with node set the set of players N and a set of edges
L, being a subset of {{i, j} | i = j, i, j ∈ N}. The set L stands for the collection of
communication links between players. If {i, j} belongs to L, then players i and j are able
to communicate with each other.
A sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik′) is called a path from i1 to ik′ in the graph
(N,L) if {ik, ik+1} ∈ L for k = 1, . . . , k
′ − 1. A coalition of players S ∈ 2N forms a
network in the graph (N,L) if S is connected in the graph, i.e., for any i, j ∈ S, i = j,
there is a path in S from i to j. Notice that the empty set and all singleton coalitions are
networks by definition. Any two members in a network are able to communicate with each
other directly or indirectly through other players in the same network. A coalition S of
players is called a component in the graph (N,L) if S forms a network and S cannot form
a larger network with any other player j ∈ N \ S. A sequence of at least three different
nodes (i1, . . . , ik′) is called a cycle in the graph (N,L) if (1) it is a path in (N,L) and (2)
{ik′, i1} ∈ L. A graph (N,L) is cycle-free if it does not contain any cycle. For given graph
(N,L), each K ∈ 2N induces the subgraph (K,L(K)), with L(K) = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ K}
the set of links on K. Notice that L(N) = L. The concepts defined above for the graph
(N,L) are defined similarly for (K,L(K)). For K ∈ 2N , let CL(K) denote the collection of
all networks in the graph (K,L(K)) and let ĈL(K) denote the collection of all components
in (K,L(K)).
A directed graph on N is a pair (N,D) such that D ⊂ {(i, j) ∈ N ×N | i = j} is
a collection of directed edges. A player i is a predecessor of j and j a successor of i in D
if (i, j) ∈ D. A sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik′) is called a directed path from i1 to
ik′ in the directed graph (N,D) if (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for k = 1, . . . , k′ − 1. A tree (N, T ) is a
directed graph, with T a collection of exactly n− 1 directed edges, such that from exactly
one node, called the root, there is a unique directed path to every other node. In a tree the
root has no predecessor and any other player has exactly one predecessor. On the other
hand, a player may have multiple successors. A player j is a subordinate of i in T if T
contains a directed path from i to j. Given an undirected graph (N,L), a tree (N, T ) is
a spanning tree of (N,L) if (i, j) ∈ T implies {i, j} ∈ L, i.e., any directed edge in T is an
undirected edge in L.
In the game (N, v, L), a coalition S of players can only cooperate and realize its
worth v(S) if S forms a network. In the rest of the paper, we assume without loss of
generality that N is connected, so N itself forms a network and can realize its worth v(N).
Otherwise, the analysis can be done analogously for each component in the graph (N,L).
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When each pair of players can communicate directly, i.e., L = {{i, j} | i = j, i, j ∈ N},
(N, v, L) is said to be a game with complete communication structure and often shortly
denoted by (N, v).
A payoff vector x ∈ Rn of (N, v, L) is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff xi ∈ R
to every player i ∈ N . We write x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for S ∈ C
L(N). A payoff vector x is
efficient if x(N) = v(N), i.e., it fully distributes the worth v(N) of the grand coalition N
to all its members. A solution for games with communication structure is a mapping F
that assigns to every game with communication structure (N, v, L) a set of payoff vectors
F (N, v, L) ⊂ Rn. A solution F is efficient if for any (N, v, L) every element of F (N, v, L)
is efficient.
The best-known set-valued solution for games (N, v) is the core, see Gillies [6],
which assigns to every game (N, v) the set C(N, v) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), and x(S) ≥
v(S), for all S ∈ 2N} of undominated efficient payoff vectors. With full communication, a
payoff vector x is dominated if there exists a coalition S such that x(S) < v(S). However,
for games with communication structure (N, v, L), a coalition S can only cooperate if it
forms a network and so a payoff vector x can only be dominated by networks. Conse-
quently, for games with communication structure (N, v, L) the core becomes equal to the
set C(N, v, L) given by
C(N, v, L) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), and x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ∈ CL(N)}, (2.1)
i.e., the core is the set of efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any network S.
Clearly, it holds that C(N, v, L) is equal to C(N, vL), where vL is the characteristic function
of the Myerson restricted game (N, vL) induced by (N, v, L) and defined for S ∈ 2N by
vL(S) =
∑
K∈ĈL(S)
v(K),
i.e., the value of coalition S equals the sum of the values of its components in (S, L(S)).
The best-known single-valued solution for games (N, v) is the Shapley value, see
Shapley [16], which assigns to every game (N, v) the average φ(N, v) of all n! marginal
vectors mπ(v) ∈ Rn of the game (N, v), where π = (π(1), . . . , π(n)) is a permutation
π : N → N assigning a unique number π(i) ∈ N to every player i ∈ N and mπ(v) =
(mπ1 (v), . . . ,m
π
n(v)) with, for every j ∈ N , m
π
j (v) = v(π
j ∪ {j})− v(πj) and πj = {i ∈ N |
π(i) < π(j)}. The Myerson value, see Myerson [13], is a single-valued solution assigning
to every (N, v, L) the Shapley value φ(N, vL) of the Myerson restricted game.
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3 The average tree solution
In this section we present a new single-valued solution for games with communication
structure. The new solution generalizes the average tree solution for games with cycle-free
communication structure as introduced in Herings et al. [9]. For a game with cycle-free
communication structure (N, v, L) the average tree solution is the average of n specific
payoff vectors. More precisely, each payoff vector corresponds to one player and this vector
is determined by the unique spanning tree (N, T ) for the cycle-free graph (N,L) in which
that player is the root of the tree. On the class of games with cycle-free communication
structure the average tree solution has been axiomatized by component efficiency and
component fairness. In [9] it is also shown that if the characteristic function of the game
satisfies superadditivity, the average tree solution lies in the core C(N, v, L).
To extend and generalize the average tree solution to the class of all games with
communication structure, first notice that when a graph (N,L) is not cycle-free, not all
links are needed to communicate. For a particular player i, every spanning tree on (N,L)
having player i as root describes a possibility in which player i is able to communicate with
the other players. We only consider spanning trees in which any player is linked to just
one successor in every component of the set of his subordinates. To describe this class of
spanning trees, we first give the definition of an admissible n-tuple of coalitions.
Definition 3.1 For given graph (N,L), an n-tuple B = (B1, . . . , Bn) of n subsets of N is
admissible if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) For all i ∈ N, i ∈ Bi, and for some j ∈ N, Bj = N ;
(2) For all i ∈ N and K ∈ ĈL(Bi \ {i}), we have K = Bj and {i, j} ∈ L for some j ∈ N.
Condition (2) of Definition 3.1 states that for every i ∈ N each component in the
subgraph (Bi \ {i}, L(Bi \ {i})) is equal to Bh for some player h being linked to player i.
The same condition also implies that every set Bi is a network.
Given an admissible n-tuple of coalitions B, we interpret Bi as the set of subor-
dinates of player i together with player i himself. We define the directed graph (N,TB)
as
TB = {(i, j) | Bj ∈ Ĉ
L(Bi \ {i}), i ∈ N}. (3.2)
The notion of admissible n-tuples has the following properties.
Lemma 3.2 For a graph (N,L), let B be an admissible n-tuple of coalitions. Then the
following properties hold.
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(1) There exists a unique player i ∈ N such that Bi = N .
(2) For all i, j ∈ N , i = j, either Bi ⊂ Bj \ {j}, or Bj ⊂ Bi \ {i}, or both Bi ∩ Bj = ∅
and Bi ∪Bj ∈ C
L(N);
(3) The directed graph (N,TB) is a spanning tree.
Proof. From Condition (1) of Definition 3.1 it follows that Bi = N for some i ∈ N. By
Condition (2) of Definition 3.1, for every K ∈ ĈL(Bi \ {i}) there exists j ∈ N such that
K = Bj and {i, j} ∈ L, which leads to edges (i, j) of TB. Next we continue this procedure
with every j chosen in the previous step for which the network Bj is not a singleton. We
proceed in this way until all remaining networks are singletons. It follows immediately that
TB is a spanning tree, which proves (3). Observe that, for all j ∈ N, Bj \ {j} is the set of
subordinates of player j in the spanning tree TB. Therefore, there is a unique i ∈ N for
which Bi = N , which proves (1).
To prove (2) consider two nodes i and j. Because TB is a spanning tree, either
Bi ⊂ Bj \ {j} or Bj ⊂ Bi \ {i} or Bi ∩ Bj = ∅. It remains to be shown that Bi ∪ Bj is
not a network in the last case. Since TB is a spanning tree, there is j′ = i, j such that
Bi ⊂ Bj′ and Bj ⊂ Bj′ . Let Bj′ be the minimal set with these properties. Moreover, there
is no (j′, j′′) ∈ TB such that both Bi ⊂ Bj′′ and Bj ⊂ Bj′′ , since otherwise Bj′′ is a proper
subset of Bj′. It follows that Bi and Bj belong to different components of Ĉ
L(Bj′ \ {j′}),
so Bi ∪ Bj is not connected.

Property (2) of Lemma 3.2 says that if Bi and Bj are two different components in
ĈL(Bk \{k}) for some k ∈ N , then there is no link in the graph (N,L) between any player
of Bi and any player of Bj. This means that for any two players, if in T
B one player is
not a subordinate of the other, they cannot communicate directly with each other in the
graph (N,L). In the spanning tree TB, the root player i communicates with a subordinate
h in TB through his successor j in the component K of ĈL(N \ {i}) that contains h.
Then Bj = K and on his turn, player j communicates with his subordinates through his
successors in the components in ĈL(Bj \ {j}), and so on.
The following example illustrates the concept of admissible n-tuples and their in-
duced spanning trees.
Example 3.3 Let (N,L) be given byN = {1, 2, 3, 4} and L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 4}},
i.e., L is given by the cycle (1, 2, 3, 4). Consider the case where B1 = N . By Condition (2)
of Definition 3.1, for the unique component K = {2, 3, 4} of the subgraph on {2, 3, 4},
there exists a player i such that {1, i} ∈ L and Bi = K. Clearly, it holds that i = 2 or
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i = 4. First, take i = 2, then B2 = {2, 3, 4}. For the unique component K
′ = {3, 4} of
the subgraph on B2 \ {2} = {3, 4}, there is a player j such that {2, j} ∈ L and Bj = K ′.
Clearly, j = 3 and it follows that B3 = {3, 4}. Finally B4 = B3 \ {3}, so B4 = {4} is a leaf.
Analogously, when i = 4 is taken, B4 = {2, 3, 4}, B3 = {2, 3}, and B2 = {2}.
So, there are two admissible n-tuple of coalitions with B1 = N , namely (i) B1 =
N , B2 = {2, 3, 4}, B3 = {3, 4}, B4 = {4}, and (ii) B1 = N , B2 = {2}, B3 = {2, 3},
B4 = {2, 3, 4}. By symmetry, for any i ∈ N there are two admissible n-tuples of coalitions
with Bi = N and thus there are 8 admissible n-tuples of coalitions for the cyclic graph on
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The two sets of admissible n-tuple of coalitions with B1 = N induce two span-
ning trees with player 1 as root, the spanning tree T1 = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)} in case
B2 = {2, 3, 4} and the spanning tree T2 = {(1, 4), (4, 3), (3, 2)} in case B4 = {2, 3, 4}.
Observe that there are also two other spanning trees with player 1 as root, namely T3 =
{(1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 3)} and T4 = {(1, 2), (1, 4), (4, 3)}, but these spanning trees do not cor-
respond to an admissible n-tuple of coalitions, because player 1 has two successors in
component {2, 3, 4} of ĈL(N \ {1}).

As shown in the example, the set of spanning trees induced by the collection of
admissible n-tuples of coalitions is typically a proper subset of the collection of all span-
ning trees of (N,L). To define the average tree solution for the class of all games with
communication structure we only consider spanning trees induced by admissible n-tuples of
coalitions. For a game with communication structure (N, v, L), let BL denote the collection
of all admissible n-tuples of coalitions B = (B1, . . . , Bn) for the graph (N,L). Then, for
every B ∈ BL, we define the marginal contribution vector mB(N, v, L), yielding a payoff
mBi (N, v, L) for every player i ∈ N .
Definition 3.4 For a game with communication structure (N, v, L), the marginal contri-
bution vector mB(N, v, L) ∈ Rn corresponding to B ∈ BL is the vector of payoffs given
by
mBi (N, v, L) = v(Bi)−
∑
K∈ĈL(Bi\{i})
v(K), i ∈ N.
At mB(N, v, L) every player i ∈ N receives a payoff equal to the worth of network Bi
minus the total worths of the components of (Bi \ {i}, L(Bi \ {i})). With respect to the
corresponding spanning tree TB, the marginal contribution gives to every player the value
of the network consisting of himself and his subordinates minus the total payoff assigned
to his subordinates. Notice that a marginal contribution vector mB(N, v, L) is a marginal
vector mπ of the restricted game (N, vL) for any permutation π satisfying Bi \ {i} ⊂ πi for
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all i ∈ N . We remark that spanning trees that are not induced by an admissible n-tuple
of coalitions do not yield a payoff vector that has this property.
We now define the average tree solution as the average of all marginal contribution
vectors over the collection of admissible n-tuples of coalitions.
Definition 3.5 Average tree solution
On the class of all games with communication structure (N, v, L), the average tree (AT)
solution assigns the payoff vector AT(N, v, L) given by
AT(N, v, L) =
1
|BL|
∑
B∈BL
mB(N, v, L).
The number of admissible n-tuples depends on the structure of the graph (N,L).
In the next section we discuss two special cases, cycle-free graphs and complete graphs.
4 Special cases of games with communication struc-
ture
In this section we discuss the average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication
structure and complete communication structure.
Lemma 4.1 Let (N,L) be a cycle-free graph. Then for every i ∈ N there is exactly one
admissible n-tuple of coalitions such that Bi = N .
Proof. For some i ∈ N , take Bi = N . Since the graph is cycle-free and connected, player
i is linked to exactly one player in each component of N \ {i}. For given K ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}),
let j ∈ K be the unique player such that {i, j} ∈ L. Then, by Condition (2) of Definition
3.1, Bj = K. Next, for each component Bj ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}), player j ∈ Bj is linked to
exactly one player in each component of ĈL(Bj \ {j}). For given K ′ ∈ ĈL(Bj \ {j}), let
j′ ∈ K ′ be the unique player in K ′ such that {j, j′} ∈ K ′. Then, again by Condition (2)
of Definition 3.1, Bj′ = K
′. Continuing this procedure as long as there are components
consisting of more than one player, we obtain the unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions
with Bi = N . 
Using this lemma we show that for games with cycle-free communication structure
the average tree solution coincides with the solution introduced in Herings et al. [9] for this
particular class of games. When (N,L) is cycle-free, let T i, i ∈ N , be the unique spanning
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tree with node i as its root. For a game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L),
the spanning tree T i determines a marginal contribution vector mi(N, v, L) with payoff
mij(N, v, L) = v(K
i
j)−
∑
{j|(j,j′)∈T i}
v(Kij′), j ∈ N, (4.3)
where, for j ∈ N , K ij is the set of nodes consisting of j and all its subordinates in T
i. The
average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication structure as introduced in
Herings et al. [9] then yields the average of these n marginal contribution vectors.
Theorem 4.2 For a game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) it holds that
AT (N, v, L) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
mi(N, v, L).
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 we have that for any i ∈ N there is a unique admissible n-tuple
of coalitions with Bi = N . Let B(i) be this n-tuple of coalitions. From the construction
in the proof of Lemma 4.1, it follows immediately that the spanning tree TB(i) corre-
sponding to B(i) coincides with the unique spanning tree T i having i as its root. Hence
mi(N, v, L) = mB(i)(N, v, L) for all i ∈ N . 
Next we prove that for games with complete communication structure the average
tree solution coincides with the Shapley value.
Lemma 4.3 Let (N,L) be a complete graph. Then there are n! admissible n-tuples of
coalitions.
Proof. For an arbitrarily chosen player i1 ∈ N , we consider the collection of all admissible
n-tuples B with Bi1 = N . Since the graph (N,L) is complete, N \ {i1} is connected and
thus consists of exactly one component. For any arbitrarily chosen i2 in N \ {i1} we can
set Bi2 = N \ {i1}, since i1 is connected with every other player. The network Bi2 \ {i2}
consists of exactly one component and for every i3 ∈ Bi2 \ {i2} we can set Bi3 = Bi2 \ {i2}.
Continuing in this way at each step k, k = 1, . . . , n, we can take an arbitrarily chosen
player ik in Bik−1 \ {ik−1} and set Bik = Bik−1 \ {ik−1}, where Bik = N when k = 1. Since
at each step, any player in the remaining set can be chosen, there are n! admissible n-tuples
of coalitions. 
Theorem 4.4 Let (N, v, L) be a game with complete communication structure. Then the
average tree solution is equal to the Shapley value of (N, v).
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Proof. For a game (N, v), the Shapley value φ(N, v) is equal to the average of all n! mar-
ginal vectors mπ(v). Let B be an admissible n-tuple of coalitions constructed in the proof
of Lemma 4.3. For the player ik chosen at step k, the marginal contribution m
B
ik
(N, v, L)
is equal to v(Bik) − v(Bik+1), where Bin+1 = ∅. We define a bijection between admissi-
ble n-tuple of coalitions B and permutations π by assigning permutation πB, given by
πBik = n + 1 − ik, k = 1, . . . , n, to admissible n-tuple of coalitions B. By definition of the
marginal vector we have that mπ
B
(v) = mB(N, v, L). Hence, the average of all marginal
contribution vectors mB(N, v, L) is equal to the average of all marginal vectors mπ(v). 
Observe that for a complete graph each of the n! admissible n-tuples of coalitions
generates a path graph, i.e., each player has exactly one successor and one predecessor,
except the first chosen player who has no predecessor and the last chosen player who has
no successor. On the other hand, any given path graph corresponds to the permutation in
which the last chosen player enters first, the second last chosen player enters second, and
so on.
5 Core properties
In this section we provide conditions for arbitrary games with communication structure
under which the average tree solution lies in the core. For a game (N, v) it is well-known
that the Shapley-value φ(N, v) is in the core C(N, v) if the game is convex, the requirement
that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for every S, T ⊂ N . A game is superadditive if
these inequalities are satisfied for every S and T such that S ∩ T = ∅. Superadditivity
is insufficient to ensure that a game has a non-empty core. We say that a game with
communication structure (N, v, L) is superadditive if its Myerson restricted game (N, vL)
is superadditive. It can be shown that a superadditive game with cycle-free communica-
tion structure has a non-empty core. In particular, it follows from Demange [5] that any
marginal contribution vector mi(N, v, L) as defined in equation (4.3) is in C(N, vL). In
fact, when vL is superadditive, then vL is permutationally convex for any permutation
corresponding to the spanning tree T i and then, according to Granot and Huberman [7],
mi(N, v, L) is in C(N, vL) for all i ∈ N . So, for superadditive games with cycle-free com-
munication structure the average tree solution is in C(N, v, L), because the core is convex.
Also for games with cycle-free communication structure, Talman and Yamamoto [18] pro-
vide a condition even weaker than superadditivity under which the average tree solution
is still in the core. We next introduce the notion of link-convexity, which will be shown to
assure that the average tree solution is an element of the core for an arbitrary game with
communication structure.
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Definition 5.1 Link-convexity
A game with communication structure (N, v, L) is link-convex if
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) +
∑
K∈ĈL(S∩T )
v(K),
for any S, T ⊂ N that satisfy
(1) S, T, S \ T, T \ S, and (S \ T ) ∪ (T \ S) are non-empty networks,
(2) N \ S or N \ T is a network.
Notice that Condition (1) of Definition 5.1 implies that S ∪ T is a non-empty network.
Link-convexity reduces to convexity for the class of games with complete commu-
nication structure because for those games all subsets of N are networks and convexity is
satisfied trivially when S, T, S \T, or T \S equals the empty set. We illustrate the concept
of link-convexity with an example.
Example 5.2 (Cycle graph)
We consider the graph (N,L) with L = {{i, i + 1} | i = 1, . . . , n}, where n + 1 = 1,
so the players are located on a circle. In this case any non-empty network has form
S = [i, j], where [i, j] denotes the set {i, i + 1, i + 2, . . . , j} if j ≥ i and [i, j] denotes the
set {i, i + 1, . . . , n, 1, . . . , j} if j < i. Observe that for any S = [i, j], the set N \ S is a
network. By Condition (1) of Definition 5.1 we must have that both S and T are non-
empty networks, so for some i, i′, j, j′, S = [i, i′] and T = [j, j′]. Then both N \S and N \T
are networks, so Condition (2) of Definition 5.1 is redundant. Without loss of generality
assume that j ≥ i. Then the condition that S \ T and T \ S are non-empty, requires that
j > i. Now, if j = i′+1 then we must have that j′ = i−1, otherwise (S \T )∪(T \S) is not
a network. Therefore, for the game with cyclic communication structure the link-convexity
property requires that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )
for all sets S = [i, i′] and T = [j, j′] such that j > i and further j = i′+1 or j′ = i− 1, i.e.,
the two sets must be such that S ∪ T and S ∩ T are both networks. 
The next theorem shows that the average tree solution is in the core if the game is
link-convex.
Theorem 5.3 If the game with communication structure (N, v, L) is link-convex, then
AT (N, v, L) ∈ C(N, v, L).
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Proof. We show that under link-convexity any marginal contribution vector mB =
mB(N, v, L), B ∈ BL, is an element of C(N, v, L), which proves the result because the
core is a convex set.
Consider anyB = (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ BL. We have by definition ofmB that
∑
i∈N m
B
i =
v(N). To prove that
∑
i∈Sm
B
i ≥ v(S) for S ∈ C
L(N), take any S ∈ CL(N) and let
S1, . . . , Sk′ be the components in the subgraph (S, T
B(S)). Since Sk is connected, the
directed subgraph (Sk, T
B(Sk)) is a tree and there exists a unique rk ∈ Sk such that Sk ⊂
Brk , k = 1, . . . , k
′. Notice that rk is the root of (Sk, T
B(Sk)). We define I = {r1, . . . , rk′}.
By Property (2) of Lemma 3.2, either Bi ⊂ Bj \ {j} or Bj ⊂ Bi \ {i} or Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for
every pair i, j ∈ I. Since S is a network and because of Property (2) of Lemma 3.2 it holds
that there is one node, say, rk′ , such that for every i ∈ I \ {rk′} the node i is a subordinate
of rk′ and therefore Bi ⊂ Brk′ \ {rk′}. Since Si ⊂ Bi, for all i ∈ I, we have that S ⊂ Brk′ .
Next, for k = 1, . . . , k′, let Frk = {j ∈ N \ S | (i, j) ∈ T
B for some i ∈ Sk} be the
set of successors of Sk in the tree T
B outside S.We define J = ∪i∈IFi as the set of all such
successors. For j ∈ J , let
Hj = {i ∈ I | Bi ⊂ Bj and  ∃i
′ ∈ I \ {i} such that Bi ⊂ Bi′ ⊂ Bj}.
We define N̂ = I ∪ J and the directed graph (N̂ , T̂ ) by
T̂ = {(i, j) | j ∈ Fi, i ∈ I} ∪ {(j, i) | i ∈ Hj, j ∈ J}.
Clearly, (N̂, T̂ ) is a tree with root rk′.
For k = 1, . . . , k′, Brk = Sk ∪ (∪j∈FrkBj), so
∑
i∈S
mBi =
k′∑
k=1
[v(Brk)−
∑
j∈Frk
v(Bj)]. (5.4)
Without loss of generality, let r1, . . . , rk′ be such that k
1 < k2 implies Br
k1
⊂ Br
k2
or
Br
k1
∩Br
k2
= ∅. Next, for k = 0, . . . , k′, let Bk = Br1 ∪ · · · ∪Brk , so it follows that B
0 = ∅.
Consider some k ∈ {1, . . . , k′} and write Frk = {j1, . . . , jℓ′}. If Frk = ∅, then we
define l′ to be zero. When ℓ′ ≥ 1, then, for ℓ = 1, . . . , ℓ′, the two sets S ∪ Bk−1 ∪ (Bj1 ∪
· · · ∪ Bjℓ−1) and Bjℓ satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 5.1. Notice that the
components of their (possibly empty) intersection are the networks Bi for i ∈ Hjℓ and that
Bjℓ \ (∪i∈HjℓBi) is linked to Sk. Now it follows from link-convexity that for l = 1, . . . , l
′,
v(S∪Bk−1∪ (Bj1 ∪ · · · ∪Bjℓ−1))+v(Bjℓ) ≤ v(S ∪B
k−1∪ (Bj1 ∪ · · ·∪Bjℓ))+
∑
i∈Hjℓ
v(Bi).
By repeated application of this argument and since Sk∪Bk−1∪ (∪j∈FrkBj) = B
k, it follows
that for k = 1, . . . , k′,
v(S ∪ Bk−1) +
∑
j∈Frk
v(Bj) ≤ v(S ∪B
k) +
∑
j∈Frk
∑
i∈Hj
v(Bi).
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Notice that this formula is also valid if Frk = ∅, since then S ∪B
k−1 = S ∪Bk.
By repeated application of the last inequality, we find that
v(S) +
k′∑
k=1
∑
j∈Frk
v(Bj) ≤ v(S ∪ B
k′) +
k′∑
k=1
∑
j∈Frk
∑
i∈Hj
v(Bi).
Since S ∪ Bk
′
= Brk′ and T̂ is a tree, it follows that every Brk , k = 1, . . . , k
′ − 1, appears
exactly once in the right-hand side, and we obtain
v(S) +
k′∑
k=1
∑
j∈Frk
v(Bj) ≤
k′∑
k=1
v(Brk). (5.5)
From equations (5.4) and (5.5) it follows that
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
mBi ,
which completes the proof. 
From this theorem the next corollary follows immediately
Corollary 5.4 If a game with communication structure (N, v, L) is link-convex, then the
core C(N, v, L) is non-empty.
For games with complete communication structure link-convexity and convexity
coincide with each other. The next lemma shows that under weaker conditions than su-
peradditivity, a game with cycle-free communication structure is link-convex.
Lemma 5.5 A game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) is link-convex if
and only if for every S ∈ CL(N) it holds that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for all T ∈ ĈL(N \ S).
Proof. Let S, T ⊂ N satisfy the conditions in Definition 5.1 with N \ T being a network.
We first show that S ∩ T = ∅. Suppose S ∩ T = ∅. Take any i′ ∈ S ∩ T . Since S \ T and
T \ S are non-empty and (S \ T ) ∪ (T \ S) is a non-empty network, there exists i ∈ S \ T
and j ∈ T \ S such that {i, j} ∈ L. Since both S and T are networks, there exists a path
in S connecting i and i′ and there exists a path in T connecting j and i′. This contradicts
the fact that (N, v, L) is a game with cycle-free communication structure.
From S∩T = ∅, it follows that S ⊂ N \T. Since both N \T and S∪T are networks,
S ⊂ N \ T, and (N,L) is cycle-free, we must have T ∈ ĈL(N \ S). 
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The lemma shows that the condition v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) only has to hold
for any network S and any network T that is a component of (N \ S, L(N \ S)). Notice
that for a game with cycle-free communication structure superadditivity requires that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for any disjoint S and T such that S, T, and S ∪ T are networks.
So, the next corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 5.6 A game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) is link-convex if
v is superadditive.
The following example illustrates that link-convexity is strictly weaker than superad-
ditivity and also that the Myerson value may not be in the core if the game is link-conevex.
Example 5.7 (Path graph)
We consider the cycle-free graph on (N,L) with L = {{j, j + 1} | j = 1, . . . , n − 1}.
In L the players are positioned along a path from 1 to n and any player is connected
with his neighbors. In this case any non-empty network S is of the form S = [i, j],
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, where [i, j] = {i, . . . , j}. From Theorem 5.5 it follows that for a game with
path communication structure (N, v, L), link-convexity requires
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T )
for all coalitions S and T such that S = [i, j] and T = [1, i− 1] or T = [j + 1, k]. Observe
that for games with path communication structure link-convexity is indeed weaker than
superadditivity.
For example, consider the path graph with N = 4 and L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}.
The values of the connected coalitions are given by v({1}) = v({4}) = 0, v({2}) = 2,
v({3}) = 4, v([1, 2]) = v([2, 3]) = 2, v([3, 4]) = 4, v([1, 3]) = v([2, 4]) = 6, and v([1, 4]) = 6.
This game is not superadditive, since for the networks S = {2} and T = {3} we have that
v([2, 3]) = 2 < v({2}) + v({3}) = 6. Link-convexity only requires that
v([1, j]) + v([j + 1, k]) ≤ v([1, k]) for j = 1, 2, 3, j + 1 ≤ k ≤ 4
and
v([i, j]) + v([j + 1, 4]) ≤ v([i, 4]) for i = 2, 3, i ≤ j < 4.
Indeed, all these inequalities are satisfied for the game. Observe that this game has a
unique core element (0, 2, 4, 0)⊤.
The average tree solution for this game is equal to the average of the marginal
contribution vectors of the spanning trees induced by the four admissible 4-tuples B1 =
(N, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4}, {4}), B2 = ({1}, N, {3, 4}, {4}), B3 = ({1}, {1, 2}, N, {4}), and B4 =
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({1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, N). All these 4-tuples yield the same marginal contribution vector,
(0, 2, 4, 0)⊤. Therefore the average tree solution equals AT(N, v, L) = (0, 2, 4, 0)⊤, coincid-
ing with the unique core element.
To compute the Myerson value of the game, we first determine the Myerson re-
stricted game (N, vL). For S ∈ CL(N) we have vL(S) = v(S) and for S ∈ CL(N) we have
vL({1, 3}) = 4, vL({1, 4}) = 0, vL({2, 4}) = 2, vL({1, 3, 4}) = 4, and vL({1, 2, 4}) = 2.
The Myerson value is equal to the Shapley value of the game (N, vL) and therefore
equal to (1
3
, 5
3
, 11
3
, 1
3
)⊤. Notice that the Myerson value lies outside the core. This is caused
by the fact that the Myerson value is the average of all the 24 marginal vectors of (N, vL).
Each marginal vector of (N, vL) is induced by a permutation; not every permutation yields
a marginal vector which is a core element. For example, the permutation π1 = (1, 4, 2, 3)
leads to the marginal vectormπ
1
= (0,−2, 4, 4)⊤ and the permutation π2 = (4, 1, 3, 2) leads
to the marginal vector mπ
2
= (0, 4, 0, 2)⊤. Both marginal vectors lie outside the core and
are not induced by an admissible 4-tuple of coalitions. 
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper the average tree solution is proposed for the class of all games with commu-
nication structure. This solution generalizes both the solution introduced by Herings et al.
[9] for the class of games with cycle-free communication structure and the Shapley value
for the class of games with complete communication structure. We introduce the condition
of link-convexity under which the average tree solution is an element of the core. For the
class of games with cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is weaker than su-
peradditivity. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity, and only coincides with
it for games with complete communication structure.
Following this study, Baron et al. [1] define and axiomatize the average tree solution
for any class of spanning trees. They also investigate several properties of the average tree
solution. In particular, they prove that the set of spanning trees induced by the class of
admissible n-tuples of coalitions is the largest class of spanning trees satisfying that the
corresponding average tree solution has the Harsanyi property.
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